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Abstract
When more than one component or activity is needed to produce the ﬁnal product, a ﬁrm may use
proprietary standards or adopt a common standard to integrate these components. We call these closed
and open ﬁrms respectively, and develop a model of industry evolution to study the process by which
type of ﬁrm comes to dominate the industry. Our simulations show that an industry may diverge from
its long run equilibrium conﬁguration for sustained periods of time. Typically, the industry is dominated
by closed ﬁrms in the early history and by open ﬁrms later on. Entry and exit dynamics create transient
biases in favor of open ﬁrms. First, a closed entrant can capture multiple proﬁts whereas an open entrant
faces a lower entry barrier. However, while the odds of closed entry (relative to open entry) are initially
greater than one, they decrease with price and eventually open entry becomes more likely than closed
entry. Second, though initially closed ﬁrms can oﬀset losses in one component with proﬁts from another
and thereby have better survival as compared to open ﬁrms, when prices fall below a threshold level, a
closed ﬁrm is more likely to exit than a comparable pair of open ﬁrms. Finally, entry by an open ﬁrm
improves the relative odds of entry by a complementary open ﬁrm, especially when the two complementary
sectors diﬀer in size or eﬃciency.
Key words: open versus closed ﬁrms, industry evolution, transaction costs, simulation models,
complementarity, Babbage
1. Introduction
Many products consist of more than component. If these components are produced by distinct ﬁrms,
these ﬁrms must agree upon standards and interfaces for the components. By contrast, if all components or
stages are under the control of a single ﬁrm, the ﬁrm need not use the common standard. Farrell, Monroe,
and Saloner (1998) label these “open” and “closed” systems respectively, a terminology we adopt as well.
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In enterprise software, for instance, SAP oﬀers a closed product (an “integrated suite”, to use
the industry term), with various application modules designed to work with the basic SAP enterprise
resource planning (ERP) platform. Instead, until recently, users could opt for an Oracle database platform,
using applications from Peoplesoft for human resources, JD Edwards for ﬁnancial management, Siebel for
customer relationship management and so on. In the last couple of years, of course, all of these companies
were acquired by Oracle, and it is likely that in the future, it will oﬀer an integrated suite as well. In
other words, the future may see only competing closed systems in this market. However, one can also
ﬁnd examples where the opposite trends are visible. For instance, the computer market was initially
characterized by closed systems. In mainframes, IBM and companies like Burroughs provided complete
closed systems. Like IBM, DEC built its strategy for minicomputers around a proprietary family of
machines, with competitors such as Hewlett Packard and Wang following suit. In personal computers as
well, Langlois (1992) shows the early movers such as Apple, Commodore and Tandy oﬀered machines that
were substantially closed, especially as compared to the current situation where personal computers are
composed of standard components that can be mixed and matched by assemblers such as Dell or Gateway.
These conﬂicting trends have many causes. One fundamental tradeoﬀ is that open systems allow
“mixing and matching” (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988) whereas closed systems reduce costs of transacting
and coordinating across ﬁrm boundaries and perhaps also improve performance in situations of complexity.
Our focus in this paper is to understand how this tradeoﬀ aﬀects the dynamics of an industry where both
open and closed systems compete.
A substantial literature has analyzed the properties of open versus closed systems. Much of the
extant literature has, however, focused on situations where ﬁrms enjoy market power, and therefore,
strategic interactions between rivals are important. Instead, we assume price taking ﬁrms with conventional
U shaped cost curves. This allows us to focus on the “mix and match” advantage of open systems.
With open systems, users can “mix and match” and obtain a product closer to their preferred
variety (Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986; Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Economides, 1989).
1 Instead of
appealing to heterogeneity in preferences, we model this advantage by allowing ﬁrms to diﬀer in their
costs of producing the various components. In this, we follow Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner (1998) who
show that that absent transaction costs, the expected costs and proﬁts in long run equilibrium are lower
in an industry with “open” conﬁguration than with a “closed” conﬁguration. In our model, the long run
equilibria are driven entirely by whether the costs of transacting across ﬁrm boundaries are outweighed by
any diseconomies of scope.
2 Our focus, however, is on the short term dynamics; we show that the industry
1Related work has focused on the pricing of the product as a whole (or “bundling”, as it is sometimes referred to) as compared to the
prices of components (e.g., Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and, Denicolo (2000)). There is a much larger literature on bundling which we
do not review here. See for instance, Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984) and Whinston (1990).
2In Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner (1998), open systems are more eﬃcient, but also imply more severe price competition. With a large
number of competitors, the increase in eﬃciency is outweighed by the increase in the “toughness of competition”. In our model, ﬁrms
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does not evolve monotonically to its steady state conﬁguration. Thus, even when closed systems minimize
long run costs, the industry may nonetheless move towards openness for sustained periods.
Inevitably, discussions of closed versus open systems link to questions of the horizontal and vertical
scope of the ﬁrm, even when the latter is not a central focus. The link is obvious: In a closed system,
the owner of the proprietary standard will typically have to produce all the components or else forgo the
advantages of transaction cost reduction and performance improvement. Indeed, in the software sector,
many a time companies are acquired to integrate their products into a larger suite of products, as is
apparently the situation in the Oracle acquisitions of Siebel and PeopleSoft. But Oracle is far from alone.
For instance, Microsoft acquired anti-virus software company, GeCad, in order to oﬀer anti-virus products
to its customers, raising widespread speculation that it would begin competing with security ﬁrms such
as Symantec in the near future.3 Similarly, there is evidence that open conﬁgurations are more conducive
to specialized entry. For instance, Arora and Gambardella (1998, 2006) argue that advances in chemical
engineering, which decoupled the design of chemical processes from the speciﬁcities of inputs and output
requirements idiosyncratic to individual producers, encouraged the growth of engineering ﬁrms oﬀering
design services. In turn, this promoted the entry of small producers who depended on the specialists for
their design needs. Likewise, Baldwin and Clark (2000) argue that open and modular designs lead to
vertical disintegration
Even if open systems might be associated with specialists, this is not logically necessary. For
instance, Church and Gandal (1992), and Matutes and Regibeau (1989) analyze the incentives for stan-
dardization (i.e., for openness) where each component is sold by a diﬀerent ﬁrm. On the other hand,
Matutes and Regibeau (1992) analyze incentive for openness in model where the two ﬁrms produce both
components. Denicolo (2000), on the other hand, examines the case where component producers, whom
he labels specialists, compete with a system producer, called generalists. We examine the case where open
and closed conﬁgurations potentially co-exist, and analyze how entry and exit shape the industry towards
an open or closed conﬁguration.
We model a product with two components. The industry consists of both open and closed ﬁrms.
Customers treat both the open and the closed product as perfect substitutes, implying that product variety
is not an issue. Given this, the only way being closed could be proﬁtable is if this meant lower costs. We
allow for this possibility but do not impose it. Instead, we restrict the open ﬁrms to produce only one
component while closed ﬁrms produce both. Thus closed ﬁrms capture two proﬁt margins where as an
open ﬁrm can capture only one. On the other hand, an open ﬁrm can enter by being eﬃcient at producing
only one component. By contrast, a closed ﬁrm must be “good enough” at producing both. In this sense,
3http://antivirus.about.com/library/weekly/aa061103a.htm (accessed 28 March, 2006).4 Arora and Bokhari
an open conﬁguration allows for the market to “mix and match”. This recalls an observation Charles
Babbage made more than a century ago
“... (T)he master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be executed into diﬀerent processes,
each requiring diﬀerent degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that precise quantity
of both which is necessary for each process; whereas, if the whole work were executed by
one workman, that person must possess suﬃcient skill to perform the most diﬃcult, and
suﬃcient strength to execute the most laborious, of the operations into which the art is
divided.” (Babbage, 175-6 quoted in Rosenberg (1994) italics ours.)
We study the evolution of this trade-oﬀ between the “two proﬁt margin” eﬀect and the Babbage eﬀect by
using simulations from a simple two component industry where heterogeneous potential entrants chooses
to enter as either a closed or open ﬁrm. Additionally, ﬁrms that undertake all activities in-house are able
to avoid the costs of transacting across ﬁrm boundaries but may face diseconomies of scope. By varying
the relative magnitude of these two types of costs, we are able to explore both the cases where closed ﬁrms
have a cost advantage over open ﬁrms or vise versa.
The simulations are followed from the time when the industry is relatively young, with ineﬃcient
ﬁrms that have high production costs and prices, to the point where, due to entry and exits, the incumbent
ﬁrms are almost maximally eﬃcient and operating close to the minimum of the long run average cost
curve. The simulations reveal some interesting patterns. First, there is a dynamic bias in favor of the
open ﬁrms. Further, the interim industry conﬁguration is very diﬀerent from its long run state even with
costs and prices close to their long term values. As the industry evolves, it is likely to be dominated by
open ﬁrms, both in terms of the number of ﬁrms as well as the share of the ﬁnal product market. Second,
in the early periods of the industry, the reverse is true, i.e., closed conﬁguration dominates. Put another
way, our simulations show that typically, the industry evolves such it comes to be dominated by closed
ﬁrms in the early history and by open ﬁrms in the later periods. Third, there is path-dependence in the
evolution and chance can set in motion an outcome that is diﬀerent from the ‘likely’ outcomes reported
above. For instance, in some individual simulations, where the industry starts with equal number of open
and closed ﬁrms, it comes to be dominated by closed ﬁrms early in the history and remains closed, not
moving towards a more open conﬁguration.
What explains these patterns? There are two key elements of our story. The ﬁrst is the Babbage
eﬀect - whereas a closed ﬁrm has to master an array of activities and processes, an open ﬁrm needs to
master only a few. In our model, a potential entrant observes its capabilities before deciding whether to
enter, and if so, whether it should produce one or both components. Thus, even though a ﬁrm would
want to capture both proﬁt margins, a ﬁrm is more likely to be able to master one production process
rather than two. As prices fall, the “two proﬁt margins” become less important than being good enough
at producing both components. Thus, over the lifecycle of the industry, as prices fall, entry by openReturns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 5
ﬁrms is more likely. When a potential entrant can capture multiple proﬁts, it enters as a closed ﬁrm, and
operates at an “average” capability - where the average is over the capabilities in the production of the
two components. This in turn implies that entry and exit processes for closed ﬁrms are diﬀerent: entry of
a closed ﬁrm requires multiple “good” capabilities while the exit of a closed ﬁrm depends on the “average”
capability of the ﬁrm. We show that parallel to entry, as prices fall, closed ﬁrms are also more likely to
exit than comparable open ﬁrms.
The second element of our story is that the payoﬀ to open ﬁrms depends on the eﬃciency and size of
the sector supplying complementary products. This eﬀect - the complementarity eﬀect - is important when
the size and eﬃciency of the two complementary sectors is unequal. While open entry always improves
the relative odds of entry by a complementary ﬁrm (relative to entry by a ﬁrm of its own type or a closed
standards ﬁrm), this advantage is transitory and short lived if the open sectors are of same size or eﬃciency
since an actual entry by a complementary ﬁrm in the next period will reverse the relative odds. However,
if the diﬀerence in the sectors is large, the complementary eﬀect persists in the sense that the probability
of entry in the smaller or less eﬃcient sector is higher than probability of entry as any other type of ﬁrms
until the smaller or less eﬃcient sector catches up with the complementary sector. More important, the
probability of entering as a closed ﬁrm is lower if the two open sectors are unequal compared to when the
open sectors are of equal size or eﬃciency.
In our model, we have made two explicit assumptions. First, that all open ﬁrms adopt the same
standard and second, that the open ﬁrms cannot produce both components, while closed ﬁrms produce
both. Each of these deserves some justiﬁcation. In our model there is no incentive for more than one open
standard to emerge. If there were more than one open standard, all open ﬁrms would choose the same
single standard.
Though it is natural to assume that a closed ﬁrm will produce both components, the reverse is not
true. A ﬁrm could choose to produce both components, albeit to an open standard. In our model, we have
no exogenous source of advantage for closed ﬁrms, having ruled out product diﬀerentiation and having
assumed ﬁrms to be price takers. We also do not assume that the transaction costs involved in combining
products from diﬀerent ﬁrms are greater than possible diseconomies of scope. Instead, we allow for both
possibilities. Thus we need something to make a closed conﬁguration potentially attractive. We make
this assumption, therefore, as a modeling device. Since our results show that the dynamics of industry
evolution favor an open conﬁguration, relaxing this assumption would only accentuate our results. We
discuss this further in subsection 5.3 below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section III
provides the results of the simulations and summarizes the main lessons of the simulations. Section IV
explains the dynamics of the model. This is followed by a section on robustness and conclusions.6 Arora and Bokhari
2. The Model
We model a competitive market with both closed and open ﬁrms. We assume that the ﬁnal product
consists of one unit each of two components, H and S. A ﬁrm can be closed, in which case it integrates the
production of both components in-house or, it may be open and can specialize in the production of either
of the two components. We assume that closed ﬁrms are integrated and do not buy from or sell to other
ﬁrms due to design incompatibilities. Additionally, we restrict open ﬁrms to produce only one component
(H or S). Thus, H-type ﬁrms buy component S from S-type ﬁrms at price ps and compete in the ﬁnal
good market with closed ﬁrms, where the market price is pq. The demand for the ﬁnal product is given by
D(pq) = a + bpq. (1)
Costs are assumed to be quadratic in output so that, using subscripts s,h and i to refer to S-type, H-type
and I-type (closed) ﬁrms respectively, we write the cost function as
Cs(qs,θs) = α + (q2
s + qs)θs + τ (2a)
Ch(qh,θi,ps) = β + (q2
h + qh)θh + qhps + τ (2b)
where α and β are the ﬁxed costs, θs and θh are the (in)eﬃciency parameters, and τ represents the
transaction costs due to specialization. We assume that θs and θh are iid random variables, distributed
uniformly over [1,2], that each ﬁrm draws upon entry into the industry, but after entry, are ﬁxed for the
life of the ﬁrm. The cost function for a closed ﬁrm with eﬃciency parameters θs and θh is simply the sum
of the costs of producing S and H plus a diseconomies of scope parameter γ, minus the transaction costs
2τ. Using [2] and the requirement that the closed ﬁrm produces equal amounts of S and H, a closed ﬁrms
cost function can be written as
Ci(qi,θh,θs) = Ch(·) + Cs(·) − qips − (2τ − γ)
= α + β + (q2
i + qi)θi + γ
(3)
where θi = θh + θs.
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where n,m and k are the number of I-type, H-type and S-type ﬁrms respectively at any given time (we
suppress all time subscripts for convenience of exposition). Note that since transaction and coordination
costs are internal to ﬁrms, arbitrage implies that price ph of the h good is simply pq −ps. Thus, we deﬁne
ph = pq − ps. The latter are given by
pq =



























2.2. Long Run Cost Minimizing Industry Structure. Throughout this paper, we use “long run” to
mean the stationary state, by which we mean a state where all opportunities for proﬁtable entry have been
exhausted. Given our setup, the stationary state implies that all incumbents have the same minimum
average costs, i.e., that all incumbents are maximally eﬃcient. With exogenously speciﬁed transaction
costs, if the diseconomies of scope within ﬁrms (γ) is less than the cost of transacting over markets (2τ),
only closed ﬁrms can survive so that the industry is completely dominated by closed ﬁrms, and the reverse
if γ − 2τ > 0 (see Figure 1).4
3. Simulating Industry Evolution
Though a long run equilibrium analysis is useful as a benchmark, one can ask whether and how
rapidly it will be attained. Further, how do entry and exit aﬀect convergence, and in particular, is the
process of convergence symmetric between open and closed forms - the two possible equilibrium industry
structures?
3.1. Entry and Exit and Iterations. Following Jovanovic (1982), we assume “noisy” selection, where
low cost ﬁrms survive and high cost ﬁrms exit.5 Firms are assumed to be myopic and potential entrants
choose whether to enter and their type (I-type, H-type or S-type), based only on the current market prices
and their own eﬃciency parameters, θs and θh. Post entry, costs do not change (no learning), and if it
4The reverse is true unless the industry starts out with only closed ﬁrms. In the latter case, the industry will dominated by closed
ﬁrms even if γ − 2τ > 0, simply because we do not allow an S and H type ﬁrm to enter together.
5Following Jovanovic (1982) the model allows ﬁrms to diﬀer in output due to diﬀerences in eﬃciency rather than in ﬁxity of capital.
However, we conjecture that our results are unchanged if ﬁrms diﬀered in terms of ﬁxed costs, instead of marginal costs. Following Porter
(1980) & Klepper (1996), the eﬃciency parameter of ﬁrms is a random variable with a uniform and continuous distribution.8 Arora and Bokhari
























Figure 1. Long run equilibrium with γ > 2τ
becomes unproﬁtable to continue producing as a particular type over time, a ﬁrm exits rather than switch
its organizational form. After an episode of entry, prices adjust. Incumbents who realize negative proﬁts
exit, with the ﬁrm realizing the least proﬁt exiting ﬁrst. After each exit, the remaining ﬁrms evaluate
their proﬁts at the changed prices, as deﬁned by equations [6] above, and if proﬁts for some ﬁrms are
still negative, the ﬁrm with the next lowest proﬁt exits. This process is repeated until all incumbents
have non-negative proﬁts. The last exit after each entry marks the end of a period (and one iteration
in the simulation). Note that in our model, exit takes place sequentially, with prices recomputed after
each exit.In our simulations, this process is repeated for 500 iterations and the entire process is called one
simulation. Over 1000 such simulations were done for a range of parameter values and initial conﬁguration
of the industry.6 The details of the design and algorithm are given in the appendix.
3.2. Simulation Results. In our simulations, industry structure tends to be fairly stable after 200 periods.
Typically, at the end of 500 periods, the market price is 4-6% above its long equilibrium value, and the
average total cost is about 1.5%-8.5% above the long run value and about 3% for the case when γ−2τ = 0.
Even though the industry structure after 500 periods does not correspond (with exogenous γ & 2τ) to the
long run equilibrium of the industry, these simulations illustrate how the entry and exit processes can drive
the industry structure away from its long run equilibrium. Furthermore, the interim industry structure is
very diﬀerent from its long run state even with costs and prices close to their long term values.
In the ﬁrst phase of simulations, τ and γ were varied such that simulations were studied for diﬀerent
values of γ −2τ, where γ −2τ ranges from −2 to+2. We ran 35 simulations for each value of γ −2τ, with
6All in all, we ran over 2000 simulations including those with slightly diﬀerent versions of the model, with very similar results but not
reported in this paper.Returns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 9
equal numbers of H and S type ﬁrms but with diﬀerent initial values of market share of closed ﬁrms (i)
high (MS0 ' 0.9), (ii) intermediate (MS0 ' 0.5) and, (iii) low (MS0 ' 0.2), where the market share of








The parameter values used in the simulations are given in Appendix 1. They imply that ﬁxed costs are
about 33% of the total long run minimum average costs. The range of values for γ − 2τ over which the
simulations are run are equivalent to about 40% of the total ﬁxed costs.
Figure 2 plots the value of MS for the ﬁrst 500 periods (iterations) from 5 “typical” simulations
with diﬀerent values of γ −2τ. They are “typical” in the sense that for each of the exogenously set values
of γ −2τ, 35 simulations were run and that a signiﬁcant majority of each set of 35 resulted in a time path
similar to the one shown in the ﬁgure.
















(γ − 2τ)/τ = −2
(γ − 2τ)/τ = −0.2
(γ − 2τ)/τ = 0
(γ − 2τ)/τ = 0.2 (γ − 2τ)/τ = 2.0
Figure 2. Typical time plots for market share of closed ﬁrms
For all cases, τ was set equal to .25 (which is 25% of the ﬁxed costs of an open ﬁrm). Thus
(γ − 2τ/τ) = −2 corresponds to the case when γ is 0% of the ﬁxed costs incurred by a closed ﬁrm and
(γ − 2τ/τ) = +2 corresponds to the case when γ is 50% of the ﬁxed costs of a closed ﬁrm. Given these
relative cost disadvantages, it is not surprising that the industry evolves quickly where it is dominated10 Arora and Bokhari
by closed ﬁrms in the ﬁrst case (MS = 1 by about 100th. period) and by open ﬁrms in the second case
(MS = 0 by about 250th period).
What come as a surprise are the other three cases when γ ' 2τ. A number of things are worth
noting here. First, when γ = 2τ, there is no relative cost disadvantage to either type of ﬁrms. If the
industry evolves towards a conﬁguration which minimizes the long run average costs, then there is no
reason to expect apriori, that when γ = 2τ, most of the simulations would show the pattern in Figure 2,
i.e., moving closer to MS = 0 (in fact, by the 500th period, the average value of MS was about 0.2).
Second, when γ is slightly less than 2τ, i.e., the case when (γ−2τ/τ) = −0.2, closed ﬁrms still have
a cost advantage (γ is 22.5% of the ﬁxed costs and τ is 25% of the ﬁxed costs), and so in the long run, the
industry should be completely dominated by closed ﬁrms with MS = 1. Yet, the simulations show that
except for the initial periods, the industry still evolves away from the value of MS = 1. In fact, up until
the 500th period, the value of MS is still falling, albeit very slowly beyond the 250th period.
Third, in almost all simulations, the value of MS initially increases, showing that a closed conﬁg-
uration was more likely very early in the history of the industry. Even in the cases when the ﬁnal value of
MS must equal zero (e.g., (γ −2τ/τ) = +2), the industry does not monotonically evolve towards the long
run cost minimizing structure.
In summary then, the ﬁgure shows that when γ−2τ is negative but small, MS actually moves away
from its steady state value of 1, at least for the duration of the simulation. However, when γ − 2τ  0,
MS evolves towards its steady state value of 1. By contrast, for γ − 2τ > 0, MS tends towards zero. Our
simulations also revealed that in virtually every case, closed entry was more likely very early in the history
of the industry.
To get a better sense of how “typical” these simulations are (as well as how frequent are the cases
when the industry evolves in non-typical ways), Figure 3 provides the average value of MS from the many
simulations for each value of γ − 2τ. The error bars are the standard deviation of the mean. The average
values are reported from select periods and moving from the ﬂat line (0th. period) through the steepest line
(500th. period) provides the evolution of the averages.7 When open ﬁrm have a cost advantage (γ−2τ > 0),
the industry becomes dominated by open ﬁrms early in evolution (observe for instance the snapshot from
the 300th. period) and any increases in the extent of the cost diﬀerence γ −2τ, do not have an appreciable
eﬀect on MS outcomes by the later periods, say the 500th.. By contrast, when the closed ﬁrm has a cost
advantage (γ −2τ < 0), as long as the cost advantage is small (|γ −2τ/τ| < .5), the industry conﬁguration
continues to be mixed: Open ﬁrms are likely to have a substantial market share even as late as the 500th.
7Our simulations showed that 35 runs per value of γ −2τ were enough to give us the asymptotic distributions. As a check, we ran 35
additional simulations for selected values of γ − 2τ. Not only did the mean and the standard deviation remain substantially unchanged
(diﬀerences were of the order of 1-2%), the entire distribution did not change by much either.Returns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 11



























Figure 3. Snapshots of average MS, for exogenous τ and γ
period. In particular, when γ = 2τ, the average market share of closed ﬁrms in the industry is only about
20%, well below the 50% that one might expect. Finally, there is a lot more variation in the entire evolution
path of the industry (and hence more deviations from the “typical” paths reported in Figure 3) when there
is a small cost advantage in favor of the closed ﬁrms (e.g. 0 >
γ−2τ
τ > −.5) compared to the case when
there is a small cost advantage in favor of open ﬁrms (e.g. .5 >
γ−2τ
τ > 0), i.e., error bars slightly to the
left of the zero line are much larger than the error bars slightly to the right.
To get additional insight as to how the industry evolves, we recorded and analyzed various other
statistics as well. Among the more important ones are the price and eﬃciency parameters. The top two
panels of Figure 4 show the average values of pq and ps at selected time periods (300, 400 and 500) while
the lower two panels show the average eﬃciencies for the closed ﬁrms and the S-type open ﬁrms (the
results for the eﬃciency parameter of the H-type ﬁrms are almost identical to the S-types’ and hence are
not shown). Again, the values shown are the average over the 35 simulations for the given value of γ −2τ,
with the bars indicating the standard deviation of the mean. Comparing across diﬀerent values of γ − 2τ,
prices in these later periods tend to be somewhat higher when γ − 2τ is small, especially when less than
zero. The reason is that while there is an inherent dynamic bias in favor of open ﬁrms (we show this more
formally later), the small cost advantage to closed ﬁrms allows some relatively ineﬃcient closed ﬁrms to12 Arora and Bokhari



















































t= 300 t= 400
t= 500
Figure 4. Snapshots of mean prices pq,ps & eﬃciency parameters θi and θs
survive thus driving the prices up (the average value of θi in this region is about 2.15 – see the lower left
panel in Figure 4).8 The asymmetry reported above is corroborated in lower two panels of Figure 4 as well,
which shows that the average value of θs is lower, the lower is γ −2τ when closed ﬁrm is more eﬃcient but
remains largely constant for γ −2τ positive. By contrast, the average θi for the I-type ﬁrms is higher, the
lower is γ − 2τ.
4. Explaining the Dynamics
Setting aside the non-interesting case when there is a large cost advantage to either open or closed
ﬁrms (extreme left or extreme right positions on the previous graphs), the simulation results have two main
features: (1) The dynamic processes are asymmetric. When there is a small cost advantage to closed ﬁrms,
convergence towards the long run cost minimizing conﬁguration is slower and more uneven compared to
8The prices at extreme left are lower than the prices at extreme right because of the way the values of γ − 2τ were varied over
the simulations and reﬂect the diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs. Speciﬁcally, in all simulations τ was ﬁxed at 0.25 and γ varied from 0 to 1
in increments of 0.05 thus making the diﬀerence (γ − 2τ)/τ vary from -2 to + 2. Thus at extreme left ((γ − 2τ/)τ = −2) , the total
non-variable cost to a closed ﬁrm ﬁrm is α+β +0 and the total non-variable cost incurred by two complementary open ﬁrms (an H-type
and an S-type) is α + β + 2 ∗ .25. At the center, ((γ − 2τ/)τ = 0), the non-variable costs to closed and complementary open pair are
α+β +2∗.25 and α+β +2∗.25 while at the extreme right ((γ −2τ/)τ = +2) these costs are α+β +1 and α+β +2∗.25 respectively.
For more details, see the appendix with details on simulation design.Returns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 13
when there is no (or small) cost advantage to closed ﬁrms. Also, the prices are higher in the former case.
(2) Closed entry is more likely than open entry early in the industry life cycle but the odds of closed entry
fall over time. Our explanation of the dynamic patterns observed has three parts.
First, we explore the entry conditions. Here we show that closed ﬁrm entry takes place because
of the opportunity to capture multiple proﬁts but that the probability of capturing multiple proﬁts is
lower than the probability of positive proﬁts in one activity (we call this the “Babbage eﬀect). Further,
that while the odds of closed ﬁrm entry (relative to open ﬁrm entry), are initially greater than one, they
monotonically decrease in prices and that as prices fall below a threshold value, the relative odds cross
over to a value less than one and keep decreasing with a decrease in prices.
Second, we explore the exit conditions. We show that the exit process for closed ﬁrms is diﬀerent
from the entry process. Speciﬁcally, a closed ﬁrm enters if the product of two draws is below a threshold.
However, it exits if the average of the draws is above the threshold value. Thus, when prices are high, a
closed ﬁrm has a lower probability of exit than a open ﬁrm that entered at the same time. As prices fall,
however, the situation is reversed and the closed ﬁrm has a higher probability of exit.
Third, and ﬁnally, we also show that there is yet another process that favors open ﬁrms. We call
this the complementarity eﬀect and show that if either the size or eﬃciency of open ﬁrm sectors is not equal
than the probability of entry by a closed ﬁrm is lower than if the size or eﬃciency of the two complementary
open ﬁrm sectors is equal.
4.1. Entry Conditions. The entry conditions for the potential entrant and the incumbents can be derived
from non-negative proﬁt requirement. Thus, a necessary condition for entry is that a potential entrant
draw an eﬃciency parameter such that with the given prices, pq and ps, it should earn non-negative proﬁt.
Using α = β = 1, the threshold value for a H-type or S-type ﬁrm to make zero proﬁt is
θc
h = (pq − ps) + 2(1 + τ) − 2(1 + τ)1/2(pq − ps + 1 + τ)1/2 (8a)
θc
s = ps + 2(1 + τ) − 2(1 + τ)1/2(ps + 1 + τ)1/2 (8b)
and for an I-type ﬁrm it is
θc
i = pq + 2(2 + γ) − 2(2 + γ)1/2(pq + 2 + γ)1/2. (8c)
Hence entry for a k type ﬁrm requires that the potential proﬁt be non-negative (θk ≤ θc
k ) and that it be
greater than the potential proﬁt as any other type of entry.
Condition 4.1 (Suﬃcient Entry Condition). For a potential entrant to enter as type k,where k =





i(θi),0} (9)14 Arora and Bokhari
The analysis can be made tractable if we ignore a “division of labor eﬀect”. Given the functional forms of





This inequality arises because the eﬃciency parameters enter the cost functions multiplicatively with the
marginal cost thus forcing the closed ﬁrm to produce the same level of both sand h. As an illustration,
let θs = 1 and θh = 2, and pq = 12,ps = 6, so that ph = 6 as well. Then the proﬁt maximizing quantities
for the S and H ﬁrms are 2.5 and 1 respectively, and their marginal costs are 6 and 6. A closed ﬁrm has
to produce the two components in ﬁxed proportions. Thus, it will produce 1.5 units, with a marginal cost
of 4 in the s activity and a marginal cost of 8 in the h activity. The closed ﬁrm under produces s and
overproduces h, and therefore the proﬁts are less than the sum of the proﬁts if it were to split into two
independent ﬁrms. Formally, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Division of Labor Eﬀect). Let Π∗
j(θj) be the maximized proﬁts of a j type ﬁrm














Proof. One can write Πi(θi) = Πs(θs,q(θi))+Πh(θh,q(θi))+(γ −2τ), where Πs(θs,q(θi)) are the proﬁts of





ps . By a similar argument, Πh(θh,q(θi)) < Πh(θh). The result follows
directly.9 
Note that the proﬁts of a closed ﬁrm are less than the sum of proﬁts of two complementary open ﬁrms
because of heterogeneity in the eﬃciency parameters, and because the eﬃciency parameters enter the
cost function multiplicatlvely with the marginal costs. Thus, if we had speciﬁed cost functions where
the eﬃciency parameters entered the cost additively (e.g. to the ﬁxed cost), then the proﬁt of a closed
ﬁrm would always be equal to the sum of the proﬁts of two complementary open ﬁrms. Indeed, in our
simulations we observed that the potential proﬁt for a closed entrant was usually almost equal to the sum





For the purpose of deriving analytical results, henceforth we will assume that the above relation is a strict
equality, i.e., the “division of labor” eﬀect is small. Given this assumption, we can now state the (modiﬁed)
suﬃcient entry conditions.
Proposition 4.2 (Modiﬁed Entry Conditions). Let Fh(θh) and Fs(θs) be the distributions of θh and
θs, then ignoring the division of labor eﬀect (i.e., let Π∗
i(θi ≡ θh + θs) = Π∗
s(θs) + Π∗
h(θh)),
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(2) the probability of H-type entry is Fh(θc
h).{1 − Fs(θc






s are as given in Equations [8].
Proof. Since Π∗
i(θi ≡ θh+θs) = Π∗
s(θs)+Π∗
h(θh), closed ﬁrm entry implies that Π∗
s(θs) > 0 and Π∗
h(θh) > 0.
Hence the probability of closed ﬁrm entry is given by Pr(θs < θc
s and θh < θc
h). Since θh and θs are
independent, hence Pr(θs < θc
s and θh < θc
h) = Pr(θs < θc
s) × Pr(θh < θc
h) = Fh(θc
h).Fs(θc
s). The proof for
open S or H entry is similar. 
Corollary 4.2.1 (to Proposition 4.2). Π∗
i(θi ≡ θh + θs) = Π∗
s(θs) + Π∗
h(θh) together with the suﬃcient
entry conditions (equation 9) imply that
(1) a potential entrant enters as an I-type ﬁrm if and only if θh < θc
h and θs < θc
s and,
(2) a potential entrant enters as a specialized H-type ﬁrm if and only if θh < θc
h and θs ≥ θc
s and as an
S-type ﬁrm if and only if θh ≥ θc
h and θs < θc
s.
Proof. (for (1)) Let θh < θc
h and θs < θc
s. Then Π∗
s(θs) > 0 and Π∗
h(θh) > 0. Since both proﬁts are greater
than zero and Π∗




















For the sum to be grater than zero, three cases exist: (a) Π∗
h > 0 and Π∗
s > 0. This implies θh < θc
h and
θs < θc
s. The other two cases are (b) Π∗
h > 0 and Π∗
s < 0, i.e., θh < θc
h and θs > θc
s and (c) Π∗
h < 0
and Π∗
s > 0, i.e., θh > θc
h and θs < θc
s. However, since Π∗
i = Π∗
s + Π∗
h, both (b) and (c) contradict the
assumption Π∗
i(θi) = Max{.,.,., 0}. For instance, if (b) is true, then Max{.,.,., 0} = Π∗
h while if (c) is true
then Max{.,.,.,0} = Π∗
s. Proof of (2) is similar. 
Observe that if a potential entrant draws values of θh and θs such that θh ≤ θc
h and θs ≤ θc
s, then there are
positive proﬁts to be made in each activity. Since Π∗
s(θs) and Π∗





h(θh). Simply put, in our model the closed ﬁrm entry takes place because of the opportunity to
capture two proﬁts. While the closed ﬁrm entry takes place because of the opportunity to capture multiple
proﬁts, the probability of drawing two eﬃciency parameters such that positive proﬁts can be realized in
each activity is lower than the probability of realizing positive proﬁts in one activity. Hence the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.3 (Babbage Eﬀect). For γ = 2τ, there exists a non-empty subset Θ ⊂ θs ×θh such that
for all (θs,θh) ∈ Θ, the relative odds of closed entry (relative to open) are greater than one.

















s) > 1/2 and Fh(θc
h) ∈
(0,1) if Fs(θc
s) < 1/2. Suppressing the argument θc
s and θc
h where obvious, let η < 1 be the set given by
Φ = Φ1 ∪ Φ2 where Φ1 = {(Fs(.),Fh(.)) : Fs(.) ≤ 1/2} and Φ2 = {(Fs(.),Fh(.)) : Fs(.) > 1/2,Fh(.) <
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Figure 5. Relative Odds of Closed Entry
Since Fs(.) and Fh(.) are both CDFs of two continuous random variables, hence the functions F−1
s (.)
and F−1















s)−1)} (see Figure 5, bottom right panel).
Then there exists a function G : Fs×Fh → θs×θh such that for any θ ∈ Θ, G−1(θ) ∈ Φ. Speciﬁcally, deﬁne
G(φ) for any φ = (φs,φh) ∈ Fs × Fh as G(φ) = (Gs(φs,φh),Gh(φs,φh)) = (F−1
s (φs),F−1
h (φh)). It is easy
to verify that every element of Θ is mapped to a point in the set Φ via the function G−1 (see appendix).
This establishes that for all points in the set Θ, the relative odds of closed ﬁrm entry are less than one. 
Proposition 4.3 shows that for any arbitrary distribution of θh and θs, there is a threshold level of eﬃciency,
such that the probability that a potential entrant is eﬃcient (draws a value below the threshold) at either
s or h, is greater than the probability that he is eﬃcient at both. When prices drop, the maximum value
of θh and θs falls, reducing the likelihood that an entrant can enter as an s or h type ﬁrm. The probability
that an entrant can enter as a closed ﬁrm, i.e., θh +θs is less than the corresponding threshold value, falls
even faster. More formally, we show below that if the prices are still high enough to allow any type of
entry, then the odds of closed entry (relative to specialized entry) fall with prices.
Proposition 4.4 (Evolution of the Babbage Eﬀect). For γ = 2τ, relative odds of closed entry (relative
to open entry) fall with prices.
Proof. Observer that the relative odds of closed entry given in the last proposition are monotonic in both
Fs(θc
s) and Fh(θc
h) (see also Figure 5, left panel). Further, Fs(θc
s) and Fh(θc
h) are monotonic in θc
s and θc
h
respectively and these in turn are monotonic functions of prices ph and ps (see Equations [8]). Hence the
relative odds of closed entry are monotonic in prices. 
Propositions (4.3) and (4.4) explain in part the the two most important aspects of our simulations:
(1) that initially market share of closed ﬁrms increases because prices are high enough that the relative
odds of closed ﬁrm entry are greater than one and that (2), as the system evolves, the prices fall so that
the relative odds of closed ﬁrm entry cross over to values less than one and go on decreasing so that theReturns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 17
market share of closed ﬁrms falls even more. We conﬁrm the results of the proposition above numerically































Note: ε = (γ − 2τ)/2
Figure 6. Probability (I-Type Enters|Given Entry)
as well by showing that the relative odds of closed ﬁrm entry fall with prices. Figure 6, which is drawn
for a symmetric path with pq = 2ps, shows that for high prices, the conditional probability of closed entry
(conditional on some entry) is high and drops as prices drop. The larger the value of γ − 2τ, the greater
the conditional probability of closed entry for any given price. When the advantage to closed ﬁrms is only
modest, the conditional probability can drop below 0.5 implying that “balanced” open ﬁrm entry (entry
by an an open ﬁrm followed by a complementary open ﬁrm entry in the next period) is more likely than a
closed ﬁrm entry. However, when closed ﬁrm entry is the eﬃcient form in the long run, eventually prices
fall enough to choke oﬀ open ﬁrm entry while still leaving room for closed ﬁrm entry.
4.2. Exit Conditions. Exit for open ﬁrms is similar to entry in that a open ﬁrm exits when its eﬃciency
falls below threshold i.e., θl,l = i,h,s, is larger than the threshold parameter. This is analogous to the
entry process. For instance, a ﬁrm entered as a closed ﬁrm if its eﬃciency in each activity was higher than
threshold for that activity. Exit for a closed ﬁrm, however, is diﬀerent. It exits if its average eﬃciency in
the two activates combined is below the average threshold. An immediate implication is that a closed ﬁrm
may survive even if its eﬃciency in one activity is below threshold provided it is suﬃciently more eﬃcient
in the other activity. This implies that initially, a closed ﬁrm may be better able to survive relative to a
open ﬁrm. However, as prices fall, this advantage dissipates.
Restricting oneself to the symmetric case (where ps = ph, and where γ = 2τ, so that the entry
thresholds are the same), consider the thought experiment where we follow a newly entering closed ﬁrm18 Arora and Bokhari
and a newly entering open ﬁrm.10 Since the thresholds are the same (i.e., θc
s = θc
h = θc
i/2 = θc), the
modiﬁed entry conditions imply that Pr(θl < θc
l) where l = s,h,i is the same for all types of ﬁrms. Let the
distribution of θ for the open ﬁrms be Fk(.) where k = s,h. Then the probability distribution function for
the average eﬃciency of an entering closed ﬁrm is Pr(θs + θh < 2x) = Pr((θs + θh)/2 < x) = Fi(x). The
probability that the open ﬁrm will exit if the maximum permissable value of θ is θc is equal to 1−Fk(θc),
and that for the closed ﬁrm, is equal to 1 − Fi(θc). Note that (θh + θs)/2 is the average eﬃciency of the
closed ﬁrm. Note further that Fi(.) second order stochastically dominates Fk(.). Intuitively, as an average,
(θs + θh)/2 has the same mean as θs and θh, but has “thinner” tails. This implies that Fi(.) cuts Fk(.)
from below, implying that there is some b x, such that x < b x implies Fk(x) > Fi(x) and x > b x implies
Fi(x) > Fk(x). It follows that, after entry, there is some period wherein the threshold value of θ is greater
than b x so that the probability of exit for open ﬁrms is 1 − Fk(θc) which is greater than the probability of
exit for closed ﬁrms, 1 − Fi(θc), which is true as long as Fk(θc) < Fi(θc), which is true as long as θc > b x.
However, once prices fall suﬃciently such that θc < b x, then the probability of exit for a closed ﬁrm is
higher than the probability of exit for the open ﬁrm. In other words, not only are closed ﬁrms more likely
to enter in the early stages of the industry, they are also less likely to exit as compared to open ﬁrms that
managed to enter early. As the industry evolves and prices fall, not only does entry become more diﬃcult,
exit becomes more likely as compared to open ﬁrms.
This comparison provides some additional intuition for our results. However, since the ﬁrms in the
market at any given time consists of a mixture of ﬁrms that entered at diﬀerent times and survived, and
since closed and open ﬁrms have diﬀerent relative probabilities of entry and exit over time, it is not easy
to analytically characterize what happens to exit probabilities of surviving ﬁrms. The diﬃculty is even
higher if we consider cases where γ is diﬀerent from 2τ or where ps is not equal to ph. This is one reason
why we use simulations to explore the robustness of this intuition.
4.3. Complementarity eﬀect. The ﬁnal element of our story is the inherent ability of the open ﬁrms
sector to favor entry in the complementary open sector. When a S or H type ﬁrm enters, it always improves
the relative odds of entry by a complementary open type ﬁrm. This is a short lived and transitory advantage
if the relative size and (average) eﬃciency of the two complementary sectors is almost equal – if an H type
ﬁrm enters in period t the relative odds of an S type entry are higher in period t+1, but if an S type ﬁrm
does enter in period t + 1 the relative advantage to the S type entry disappears. However, the eﬀect is
important when the size and eﬃciency of the two complementary sectors is unequal. If this diﬀerence in
sectors is large, the complementary eﬀect persists in the sense that the probability of entry in the smaller
or less eﬃcient sector is higher than the probability of entry as any other type of ﬁrm until the smaller or
10In our simulations we allow at most one entry per period so this thought experiment is best thought of as comparing across two
simulations that are identical up to some period t − 1. Then in period t, in one case, a closed ﬁrm enters and in another, a open ﬁrm
enters.Returns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 19
less eﬃcient sector catches up with the complementarity sector. More over (and more importantly) if the
distribution function of θk,k = s,h is concave, then the probability of entry as a closed ﬁrm is lower if the




s Pr(H) Pr(S) Pr(I)
1.1 1.9 .01 .81 .09
1.2 1.8 .04 .64 .16
1.3 1.7 .09 .49 .21
1.4 1.6 .16 .36 .24
1.5 1.5 .25 .25 .25
1.6 1.4 .36 .16 .24
1.7 1.3 .49 .09 .21
1.8 1.2 .64 .04 .16

















Table 1. Probability of Entry | θc
h + θc
s = 3
We state (and prove) this statement more formally below but ﬁrst provide intuition for this eﬀect using the
speciﬁc case of uniform distributions for θc
l(l = i,s,h) with support at 1,2. For the uniform distribution, the
unconditional probability of entry for a closed ﬁrm (i.e., Fs(θc
s).Fh(θc





s+1. If we ﬁx the value of θc
s+θc
h = ρ and let θc
s−θc
h =  then θc


















































. We show this





s is held constant.11 In the table below, observe that as the absolute diﬀerence between θc
h and
θc
s increases, the probability of I-type entry decreases, even though θc
h + θc
s is held constant at 3 and the
probability of I-type entry is maximum when θc
h−θc
s = 0. More formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 (Complementarity Eﬀect). If either the size or eﬃciency of the complementary open




(1/θh) ) then it implies that θc
s 6= θc
h. Further, if F0/F






















s + 1 and similarly Pr(H − type enters) = 2θc
h + θc
s − 2 − θc
hθc
s and Pr(S − type enters) = 2θc
s + θc
h − 2 − θc
hθc
s.20 Arora and Bokhari
Proof. First observe that θc
h = θc
s if and only if ph = ps for non-negative real prices (see equations 8 and
recall that ph ≡ pq −ps). Further, ph = ps implies pq = 2ps. Inspection of equations 6b shows that if either




(1/θh), then pq 6= 2ps. Hence, θc
h 6= θc
s. This proves the ﬁrst statement. The proof
for the second part is as follows: First observe that if F0/F is monotone decreasing, then FF00−F02
F2 < 0, or
simply FF00 < F02. Next, let θc
s+θc
h = ρ and let θc
s−θc
h = . Then observe that if  = 0 then θc
h = θc
s = ρ/2
and if  6= 0 then θc
s = (ρ + )/2 and θc























h) = F((ρ + )/2).F((ρ − )/2).
Let G(.) be the second of these probabilities. Then, it suﬃces to show that G(.) is maximized at  = 0. It
can be easily veriﬁed that ∂G = 0 at  = 0. Further, the second order condition for G to be a local max
at  = 0, (i.e. for ∂2
G < 0) is that F.F00 < F02. This condition can be re-written as F00/F0 < F0/F. But
this is precisely the condition which is true if F0/F is monotone decreasing. 
Note that the condition that F0/F be monotone decreasing is satisﬁed for a number of distributions
including uniform, normal and exponential distributions. A more geometric interpretation is that the
cumulative distribution be either concave (because then the condition F.F00 < F02 is automatically satisﬁed
since for concave functions F00 ≤ 0) or that if it is convex (in the region around ρ/2) then the curvature
be not too large.12 The precise condition, derivable from the second order condition F.F00 < F02, is that




5. Robustness and Extensions
5.1. Myopic decision making. Assuming myopic decision making greatly simpliﬁes our analysis. Given
the uncertainty in the environment and the possibility of multiple equilibrium paths, making fully forward
looking decisions is costly and diﬃcult. Moreover, myopic decision making is almost rational, due to
assumptions already made in the model: ﬁrms are price takers, there is no learning, and sunk costs are
absent. Introducing forward looking behavior will not eﬀect the output decision since there is no learning
and no strategic behavior. There is possible option value to entering the market (or staying in), however
this value is small since, but for jumps caused by the lumpiness of entry and exit (the number of ﬁrms is
an integer), prices would never rise over time.13 Thus, if current proﬁts are negative, then future proﬁts
would also be negative, implying an option value of zero associated with entry or “staying in”.
Forward looking behavior could conceivably aﬀect the decision on the form of entry. Indeed,
allowing for more sophisticated forward looking behavior could further reinforce the the trend to open
12The curvature for a function y = F(x) at a point x is given by κ = d2y/dx2/

1 + (dy/dx)2	3/2, and the radius of the curvature,
is deﬁned as R ≡ 1/κ. This radius is in fact equal to the radius of the osculating circle at the point x. For relatively ﬂat curves, the
curvature is small and the radius R is large.
13Prices may rise brieﬂy because of the interaction eﬀects. For instance, the entry of an H-type will raise ps. Similarly, exit by an
S-type may trigger exit by an H-type, which may trigger further exit by an S-type. In principle, this feedback eﬀect could cause large
scale exit and large jumps in price as well. However, we did not observe such outcomes in the three thousand odd simulations that we
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conﬁguration. In our model, if the industry starts out heavily dominated with closed ﬁrms, it tends to
remain as such: An open ﬁrm typically faces a very ineﬃcient complementary sector and therefore cannot
enter unless its own eﬃciency is very high. In the extreme case, a potential open entrant may be unable to
enter if there is no complementary supplier. However, a forward looking entrant would rationally forecast
the entry of a complementary ﬁrm in the future, and therefore, would enter if its own eﬃciency were high
enough. In other words, we conjecture that allowing for forward looking ﬁrms might further accentuate
the dynamics observed.
5.2. Closed ﬁrms produces equal quantities of both quantities. This is a natural assumption, if, as
assumed here, closed ﬁrms produce to a proprietary standard that is incompatible with the open standard.
However, even if one were to allow closed ﬁrms to sell surplus quantities of one component to others,
thereby allowing closed ﬁrms to produce each component at the eﬃcient level, it would not materially
aﬀect our results. As already noted, this “division of labor” eﬀect is small in our simulations, and our
formal propositions do not rely upon it.
5.3. Open ﬁrms do not produce both components. We assume that an open ﬁrm specializes in one
of the two components. Though unrealistic, this is a modeling device to allow closed ﬁrms to capture two
proﬁt margins but restrict open ﬁrms to only one. As noted earlier, we need this because there is no other
source of advantage to being closed. Since our results indicate that the industry evolution favors open
conﬁgurations, allowing open ﬁrms to produce both components would only strengthen this tendency.
Indeed, for γ less than or equal to 2τ, no closed ﬁrms would ever emerge. An alternative would be to
assume that closed ﬁrms enjoy a cost advantage. Our existing results provide insight into the implications
of providing such a cost advantage and allowing an open ﬁrm to produce both components. In our model,
that would amount to focusing on the parameter space where γ < 2τ. In particular, when γ is below 2τ
but the diﬀerence between them is not large, there is a long term advantage to the closed conﬁguration.
Allowing open ﬁrms to produce both components would mean ﬁrst that the initial dominance of closed
ﬁrms would be much less pronounced and open ﬁrms may dominate in the early history of the industry
as well. With entry, prices fall and the “two proﬁt margins” eﬀect diminishes. Thus, we conjecture that
the industry conﬁguration would closely resemble the pattern, with a much higher market share for the
open conﬁguration early in the history of the industry and a slightly higher market share for the open
conﬁguration in the later history.
5.4. Learning by doing and cost reduction over time. Many models of industry evolution allow ﬁrms
to reduce costs, either as a function of cumulative output or through systematic investments (e.g., Klepper
(1996)). In these models, early entrants have an advantage: They have more time to learn and, with convex
investments costs, can spread the investment cost over time. This intuition suggests that allowing ﬁrms to22 Arora and Bokhari
reduce costs in our model may imply that closed industry structures may persist since initially entry and
exit conditions are favorable for closed ﬁrms. Another way to model such persistence is to allow transaction
costs themselves to depend upon the volume of transactions. With endogenous transaction costs an open
industry conﬁguration is always socially more eﬃcient in our model. However, simulations (not reported
here) strongly suggest that closed industry structure can be the long run equilibrium, particularly if the
industry starts with a high degree of market share of closed ﬁrms. It is likely, as in Farrell, Monroe, and
Saloner (1998), that closed industry structure may be even more likely if incumbent closed ﬁrms can take
actions to lower the share of open ﬁrms and raise the level of transaction costs.
5.5. Stable demand. To highlight the role of the Babbage eﬀect, we deliberately model demand as ﬁxed.
Growth in demand would moderate the fall in prices over time and therefore prolong the initial phase
wherein closed ﬁrms dominates. However, as long as demand grows slowly enough, we conjecture that our
basic ﬁndings would remain unchanged.14
6. Summary and Conclusions
There has been much discussion in recent years, often inspired by events in the information tech-
nology sector, about whether speciﬁc sub-markets will be dominated by open or closed conﬁguration.
Sometimes this distinction is phrased in terms of the rival merits of “best of breed” combinations of
components and integrated product suites. In other cases, this issue is cast in terms of compatibility of
components, or of open versus closed standards. In this paper, we assume that there is one open standard,
and multiple closed standards, each speciﬁc to the ﬁrm producing a closed product.
The choice between open and closed conﬁgurations depends on several considerations. The tradi-
tional view has emphasized how closed systems can yield lower costs by economizing on coordination and
transactions across ﬁrm boundaries. In some cases, it is believed, that closed systems may also provide
the seller with better pricing power. In this view, closed systems would dominate if these economies are
signiﬁcant. A more recent literature has examined the role of heterogeneity in preferences of consumers,
and in that context, of the “toughness of competition”, and whether there are network externalities or not,
open systems typically allow for greater variety by allowing users to “mix and match”, but may also result
in tougher price competition. However, in focusing on equilibrium outcomes with a given number of ﬁrms,
the literature has not analyzed the role of entry and exit, the focus of our paper.
We assume that a closed conﬁguration implies that the ﬁrm must produce all the required compo-
nents, whereas in an open conﬁguration, ﬁrms can specialize. Our point of departure is Charles Babbage’s
14Allowing for demand shocks would open the door to the situation where prices may rise for some period, and implies a positive
option value for entering (or staying in) the market. This makes the myopic decision making assumption less tenable and the industry
structure may take longer to approach its long run cost minimizing level. However, this should not bias our ﬁndings.Returns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 23
observation that specialization implies that one does not have to acquire competencies in all activities, or
equivalently, that acquiring a broad array of competencies is less likely than acquiring only a few. Fur-
thermore, when such competencies are not perfectly matched, integrating the activities based on those
activities imposes an additional cost. Therefore, an open conﬁguration is associated with higher eﬃciency
in our model, due to diﬀerential selection, through entry and exit. To bring into relief the role of diﬀerences
in capabilities, we develop a simple model with price taking ﬁrms, where entry and exit take place over
time, and focus on how an industry evolves over time.
Our results point to the limitations of the transaction cost perspective on industry conﬁguration.
Though transaction costs do determine the long run equilibrium conﬁguration, the industry conﬁguration
does not evolve monotonically towards it. In particular, when closed systems are only slightly more eﬃcient
in the long run than open systems, the short term dynamics in favor of open conﬁgurations can cause the
industry to evolve away from its long run equilibrium. This divergences persists even as prices come close
to those their long run equilibrium values. This divergence is therefore interesting because should further
entry into an industry be stopped for any reason, the industry conﬁguration might diﬀer from its long run
state.
Finally, our ﬁndings argue for a more cautious application of long run cost minimization to infer
the industry conﬁguration. Open conﬁgurations involve coordination of decisions. When these decisions
are made by ﬁrms that enter and exit over time, the dynamic evolution of the system may be conditioned
by its current state, and not simply by its long run equilibrium.24 Arora and Bokhari
Appendix 1
The proof of proposition 4.3 claims that “it is easy to verify that every element of Θ is mapped to a point
in the set Φ via the function G−1”. This appendix provides the veriﬁcation.
Proof. To see that every element of Θ is mapped to a point in the set Φ via the function G−1, let θ =
(θc
s,θc
h) be an arbitrary point in Θ. Then θ is either in Θ1 or in Θ2. Assume that θ ∈ Θ1. Then
G−1(θ) = (Fs(θc
s),Fh(θc
h)). But since θ ∈ Θ1, then it must be that θc
s ≤ F−1(1/2) and since Fs(.) is
monotonic therefore Fs(θs) ≤ 1/2. But then this implies that G−1(θ) ∈ Φ1. Alternatively if θ ∈ Θ2 then it
must be that θc






s)−1) and so again by the monotonicity of Fs(.) and Fh(.),
we have that Fs(θc




s)−1. This is turn means that G−1(θ) ∈ Φ2. Thus every
element of Θ is mapped to a point in the set Φ via the function G−1. 
Appendix 2
For the base line simulations, parameter values used in the simulations are α = β = 1,a = 40,b = −1.
Starting number of ﬁrms were 20 closed ﬁrm equivalents. A pair of H and S type ﬁrms is treated as
equivalent to one closed ﬁrm.
Simulation Design. Separate simulations were run for various values of γ and τ. Speciﬁcally, we varied
(γ - 2τ)/τ between -2 and 2 in increments of 0.2. For all simulations, we ﬁxed the value of τ at 0.25 and set
the value of γ between 0 and 1 so that (γ −2τ)/τ is between -2 and 2. Thus (γ −2τ/τ) = −2 corresponds
to the case when γ is 0% of the ﬁxed costs incurred by a closed ﬁrm and (γ − 2τ/τ) = +2 corresponds to
the case when γ is 50% of the ﬁxed costs of a closed ﬁrm. At the average values of τ and γ, the long run
average cost are about 6.47, and the total cost per ﬁrm are about 7.24. This implies that the total ﬁxed
costs for the open ﬁrm = α + β + 2τ = 2.5, or about 34.5% of the total cost. Thus our simulations imply
that the ﬁxed costs of the closed ﬁrm ranges between 2 and 3. Put diﬀerently, the variation is a little less
than 15% of total cost.
For each value of (γ - 2τ)/τ, we ran thirty ﬁve simulations. All the variables and initial conditions
were the same across each set of 35 simulations, except for the seed used to generate the random numbers
within a simulation, which was diﬀerent. Thus, a total of 35×21 = 735 simulations was run with the initial
number of ﬁrms chosen such that the initial degree of vertical integration was about 0.5. In addition, we
also ran some simulations with the initial conditions such that the market share of closed ﬁrms in the ﬁrst
period was about 0.2 or 0.8. For both low and high initial value of MS, (γ - 2τ)/τ was set at -2, 0 and
2 (thus the additional simulations were, 35×3 × 2 = 210).15 All simulations were run for 500 iterations
(periods).
15All in all, we actually ran over 2000 simulations where we also changed other parameters, such as (1) demand curve parameters,
(2) support for distribution of random numbers, and (3) by allowing τ to be changed endogenously (with various speciﬁcations for
endogeneity). These additional simulations, not reported in the paper, had similar results.Returns to Specialization & Industry Evolution 25
Algorithm (for Simulations).
(1) Period 1:
(a) Set initial number of ﬁrms of each type.
(b) Given the number of ﬁrms of each type, generate as many random numbers between appro-
priate ranges for the eﬃciency parameters.
(c) Use Equations (4a,4b,4c) to compute the output of each ﬁrm. If the output of any ﬁrm is
negative, delete that ﬁrm.
(d) Given the parameters of the demand curve (slope and intercept) use equations (6a,6b) to
compute market prices.
(e) Given market prices, compute the proﬁts of each ﬁrm. If ﬁrms have proﬁts less than zero, then
delete the ﬁrm with the most negative proﬁt. Recompute prices and proﬁts. Repeat, until all
ﬁrms have non-negative proﬁt. At this point, record the total outputs, number of ﬁrms of each
type, prices, market share of closed ﬁrms and other variables of interest, as the ﬁrst period
values.
(2) Period t:
(a) Generate two random numbers between 1 and 2.
(b) Given the prices at the end of the t −1 period and the two random numbers generated, compute
potential outputs and potential proﬁts for H-type, S-type and I-type (where the potential
proﬁts for I-type are computed using the sum of the two random numbers just generated). An
entry is marked (i.e., the number of ﬁrms of j-type increase by one) if the potential output is
non-negative and the potential proﬁt is maximum and non-negative.
(c) If entry takes place, recompute the prices (6a,6b) outputs (4a,4b,4c) and proﬁts of all existing
ﬁrms.
(d) If ﬁrms have negative outputs or negative proﬁts, they exit (i.e. are deleted) sequentially. The
ﬁrm making the most negative proﬁt exits ﬁrst. Prices, outputs and proﬁts of all remaining
ﬁrms are recomputed. The process is repeated until none of the incumbents have negative
outputs or proﬁts. At this point, record the total outputs, prices, number of ﬁrms of each
type, market share of closed ﬁrms and other variables of interest, as the t period values.26 Arora and Bokhari
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